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We examine the effects that a country’s net capital flows have on the (border) prices that a 
country pays for its imports of goods. Using data from 2000 to  2009 for 11 euro area 
countries we utilize a pricing-to-market specification to study exporters’ pricing behavior to 
the rest of the countries in the sample, at the industry level, for 900 goods disseminated at the 
4- digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC- revision 3) level. This allows us to 
construct a panel dataset which contains observations across exporters, importers, industries 
and time, ending up with a total of 594,327 observations. We find a strong influence of the 
importing country’s net capital inflows on the border prices of its imports of goods. This 
result is robust across different specifications of the underlying model, as well to different 
sample dis-aggregations across types of capital flows, product categories, and exporters. 
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I am unable to carry the goat, put the ox then upon me.  
(Ancient Greek proverb) 
 
Introduction 
The  debate  about  the  effects  of  financial  globalization  has  attracted  increasing 
attention  since  the  onset  of  the  recent  –  and  still  lingering  -global  economic  and 
financial crisis (GEFC). But even before the crisis erupted, a considerable body of 
evidence was accumulating against the presumed beneficial effects of capital inflows 
(e.g.  Prasad,  Rajan,  and  Subramanian,  2007;  Rodrik  and  Subramanian,  2009).  A 
central tenet of the case against financial globalization has been that capital inflows 
aggravate the structural problems of distortion-ridden economies (e.g. by leading to 
real exchange rate appreciation).  
The present paper presents evidence that there exists another (hidden) cost of capital 
inflows:  capital  importing  countries  pay  –ceteris  paribus-  higher  prices  for  their 
imports of goods. In effect, capital inflows allow domestic agents (households and 
firms) to operate, for as long as capital inflows last, with softer
1 budget constraints; 
cognizant  of this,  profit-maximizing foreign exporters respond  by charging higher 
prices to agents based in countries flush with capital inflows.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss some relevant 
theoretical  considerations,  survey  the  literature,  and  explain  why  our  empirical 
investigation  is  guided  by  the  well-developed  econometric  specifications  of  the 
pricing-to-market  literature  which  developed  out  of  concerns  relating  to  exporter 
pricing behavior when the exchange rate changes.
2 Of course, the presence of pricing-
to-market concerns does not depend on the existence of nominal exchange rate 
                                                           
1 The term is borrowed from Kornai (1980), who discusses in detail how soft budgets constraints can 
come into existence, and how they can affect agents’ behaviour. 
2 Krugman (1987) coined the term “pricing-to-market” to describe the phenomenon of exchange rate 
induced price discrimination in international markets.    3 
changes. As an illustration, consider Figure 1 which displays the aggregate border 
price  indices  for  the  imports  and  exports  of  goods  of  two  euro  area  countries, 
Germany and Greece. We choose these two countries as representative of the capital 
exporting group (Germany) and of the capital importing group (Greece). What Figure 
1 reveals is that the evolution of import prices in each country is strongly connected 
with its export prices, but not with each other.
3 We regard this as behavior consistent 
with the pricing-to-market hypothesis, since the importing country’s export prices are 
a  good  proxy  for  domestic  price/cost  developments  to  which  foreign  exporters 
respond when setting their prices.
4  
  Figure 1: Evolution of price indices for imports and exports of goods, 2000=100   
 
Source: Ameco Database, European Commission (accessed on November 24, 2011) 
 
                                                           
3 We note that, as far, as aggregate data are concerned, this is not a feature pertaining only to Germany 
and Greece, but holds for the other euro area countries as well. It is also worth noting that during the 
period examined the terms of trade improved for Germany and deteriorated for Greece.   
4 The high correlation between import and export prices for each country could possibly be explained 
on the basis of intra-industry trade. This may indeed be a plausible explanation for Germany and 
France whose (international) trade pattern is mainly intra-industry; it is a less plausible explanation for 
Greece and Portugal whose international trade is more of the inter-industry type (see, e.g. Adam and 
Moutos, 2008). Moreover, if indeed intra-industry trade were responsible for the high correlation 
between import and export prices in each country, we would expect high correlation between the 
import price indices across countries.     4 
In section 3 we undertake a detailed econometric analysis of the issue by examining 
the export pricing behavior of 11 euro area countries.
5 Using annual data from 2000 to 
2009, we try to explain exporters’ pricing behavior to the rest of the countries in the 
sample, at the industry level, for 900 goods disseminated at the 4- digit Standard 
International  Trade  Classification  (SITC-  revision  3)  level.  Thus  our  econometric 
analysis  builds  on  a  panel  dataset  which  contains  observations  across  exporters, 
importers, industries and time, ending up with a total of 594,327 observations. This 
allows us to explore the fact that each exporting country’s producers sell each good to 
different national markets
6, but also to be able to derive the aggregate effect of a 
country’s capital inflows on the prices it pays for its imports. We find that import 
prices  are  positively  related  to  the  level  of  net  capital  inflows  of  the  importing 
country. This result is robust across different specifications of the underlying model, 
which involve the addition of a host of control variables like the importing country’s 
per-capita GDP, consumption taxes, interest rate, and price developments, as well as 
each exporter’s (average) price developments across all destinations.  
Section 4 presents a series of robustness checks. We first split net capital inflows into 
their  debt  and  non-debt  (FDI)  components  and  find  that  both  components  are 
significant determinants of exporters’ price discrimination across countries. We then 
examine the underlying relationship across different product categories. Following 
Rauch (1999), we classify the SITC industries into three different groups: industries 
with  homogeneous  products,  industries  with  reference  prices  and  industries  with 
                                                           
5 Euro-11 consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain.  These 11 countries plus Luxembourg were the initial members of the euro area 
when the euro was physically introduced.  
6 Kreinin (1977), Knetter (1989), and Marston (1990) are early papers which exploited the idea that 
each exporter sells in many countries in order to empirically gauge the effect of exchange rates changes 
on the pricing of exports to different destinations.  Other investigations (e.g. Feenstra, 1989) focused on 
differences in the prices charged by exporters to foreign markets versus the prices charged in their 
home country.    5 
differentiated products. We find that the positive association between import prices 
and net capital inflows is more pronounced in industries with differentiated products. 
This finding matches well with our theoretical priors that profit-maximizing exporters 
with some market power will wish to exploit the opportunity afforded to them by the 
increase in spending capacity of agents residing in capital importing countries. Then 
we  examine  separately  the  pricing  behavior  of  the  4  biggest  euro  area  exporters 
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain) and find that the influence of capital inflows still 
holds  with  each  country’s  exporters  charging  higher  prices  to  capital  importing 
countries; we find that this also holds for the exports of 2 non- EU countries, i.e. 
Japan and USA, to euro area countries.  Section 5 provides some concluding remarks 
and discusses some implications of our findings, while in the Appendix we present 
some properties of the data used. 
2. Conceptual Underpinnings 
Financial globalization has been usually thought to be fundamentally beneficial to all 
countries (and especially to emerging market economies). According to Dell’ Ariccia 
et al. (2008) and Mishkin (2009), these benefits arise since financial globalization 
weakens the power of entrenched special-interest groups, eases financing constraints 
for  productive  investment  projects,  fosters  the  diversification  of  investment  risk, 
promotes intertemporal trade, and encourages support for institutional reforms which 
contribute to the development of efficient financial markets. 
However,  following  the  Latin  American  and  Asian  crises  of  the  1990s,    many 
economists have voiced concerns about the presumed benefits of unfettered capital 
flows (e.g. Bhagwati, 1998; Furman and Stiglitz, 1998; Rodrik and Velasko, 2000; 
Stiglitz,  2004;  Prasad,  Rajan,  and  Subramanian,  2007;  Rodrik  and  Subramanian,   6 
2009).
7 These papers  not only provide theoretical arguments as to why in second-best 
environments international financial integration may be harmful, but, after surveying 
the cross-country evidence conclude that (i) the growth benefits of capital -account 
openness is inconclusive and lacks robustness, (ii)   consumption volatility  actually 
rose (relative to output volatility) in emerging market economies during the current 
era of financial globalization, and (iii) countries that grow more rapidly are those that 
rely less and not more on foreign capital. 
The  present  paper contribute s  to  the debate  about  the desirability  of  unfettered 
international financial integration by examining  empirically a hitherto unexamined 
issue: the influence of capital inflows on the (border) prices a country pays for its 
imports.  To  our  knowledge,  Basu  and  Morita  (2007)  is  the  only  paper  that  has 
modeled  the  theoretical  link  between  capital  inflows  (or,  more  precisely,  the 
availability of credit at better terms) and the prices paid by a country for its imports of 
goods. They argue that a lowering of the interest rate charged on the foreign loans 
received  by  a  country’s  agents  will  result  in  a  rise  in  the  price  charged  by  the 
exporters of these goods to the country’s importers.  
The essence of their argument is as follows. Suppose that a domestic agent has to 
borrow funds in order to acquire goods from abroad. If p is the price charged by the 
exporter, and i stands for the interest rate on the borrowed funds, then the effective 
price paid by the importer is (1+i)p. Assume now that the domestic agent is able to 
obtain funds at a lower interest rate. From the point of view of the exporting firm – 
                                                           
7 The rise in domestic absorption (i.e. the sum of consumption, investment, and government spending 
in national income accounting) above domestic production, which net capital inflows facilitate, has 
been associated in the literature with a host of problems for the capital importing countries. (In what 
follows  we  will  use  the  terms  “net  capital  inflows”  and  “capital  imports”  interchangeably.)  Of 
particular importance for the present study is that (net) capital inflows generate higher demand for both 
tradables  and  nontradables,  which  induce  a  real  appreciation  through  a  rise  in  the  absolute  (and 
relative) price of the nontradables , and higher domestic inflation (Calvo, Reinhart, and Leiderman, 
1996).   7 
which is assumed to possess some market power, this reduction in the interest rate is 
equivalent to an outward shift of the demand curve, thus making it advantageous for 
the exporter to charge a higher price p.
8  
A similar argument applies if a higher volume of credit from abroad (at the same, or 
lower, interest rate) becomes available to domestic agents. Cognizant of this increase 
in credit availability, foreign exporters will use any market power they may have in 
order to increase –ceteris paribus- the price charged to domestic importers.
9 Given 
that our empirical investigation is aimed at explaining differences in the border prices 
charged by exporters, and not in the importing country’s consumer prices, it bears 
mentioning  that  the  qualitative  effects  of  a  rise  in  domestic  (i.e.  the  importing 
country’s) agents’ spending power on border prices is independent of whether foreign 
exporters  sell  their  goods  directly  to  domestic  consumers  (or,  firms)  or  through 
middlemen (e.g. retailers). In the latter case, the foreign exporter takes into account 
shifts in the demand curve faced by retailers, and adjusts the border price accordingly 
(see, e.g. Tirole, 1988).    
The link between foreign lending, or foreign aid, as an export promotion policy at the 
bilateral level has been discussed widely in the context of trade relations between 
industrialized and developing countries. Developing countries usually receive export 
credits from industrialized countries with the explicit requirement that they use them 
to buy goods from the latter (Fleisig and Hill, 1984; Eaton, 1989; Basu and Morita, 
                                                           
8 Basu and Morita (2007) are concerned with the effects that credit availability at better terms has on 
domestic welfare; they demonstrate that it is possible to lead to a fall in domestic welfare.  
9 An alternative interpretation for the rise of prices rests on the expansion of credit availability that 
capital  inflows  engender,  especially  through  credit  card  debt.  According  to  George  Loewenstein 
"…credit cards effectively anesthetize the pain of paying…you swipe the card and it doesn't feel like 
you're giving anything up to make the purchase, unlike paying cash where you have to hand over bills" 
(quoted  at  http://www.cmu.edu/homepage/practical/2007/winter/spending-til-it-hurts.shtml).  This 
implies that sellers would be able to raise prices as the “pain of paying” is smaller if credit cards are 
used (see, Prelec and Simester, 2001; Knutson et al., 2007).   8 
2007). This issue has also been linked with the phenomenon of “loan pushing”
10, most 
evident  in  the  years  preceding  the  1982  debt  crisis,  when  multinational  banks 
practically forced money on the less-developed countries (Kindleberger, 1989; Basu, 
1991). Although we do not wish to tie our argument to loan pushing across countries, 
there is some anecdotal evidence that domestic banks in some countries (e.g. Greece) 
were into the loan pushing business vis-￠-vis domestic households and firms.
11 In any 
case,  even  if  there  was  no  inter -country  (or  intra -country)  loan  pushing,  and 
previously  credit-constrained  agents  simply  took  advantage  of  greater  credit 
availability, it is not inconceivable that foreign exporters would indeed tak e into 
account in their pricing decisions the “augmentation” of spending power by domestic 
residents which borrowing from abroad entails.  
Foreign exporters are also likely to take into account a number of other factors when 
deciding  how  to  differentiate  prices  according  to  destination.  The  voluminous 
literature on pricing-to-market (Krugman, 1987) behaviour by exporters has made 
clear that, in addition to the bilateral exchange rate, any other variable which may 
affect  either  the  demand  curve  perceived  by  the  exporter  in  a  particular  market 
(country) or the exporter’s costs would affect its pricing decision (see, Goldberg and 
Knetter,  1997,  for  a  review  of  this  literature).  Given  our  focus  on  the  pricing  of 
                                                           
10 Loan pushing has been defined by Basu (1991, p.24) as a situation in which “…banks try to supply 
more credit to borrowing countries than the latter would voluntarily take at the prevailing interest rate”. 
Basu mentions two noteworthy cases of loan pushing (originating from Winkler,1933, and Gwyne, 
1983).  The first case involves a Bavarian hamlet in the 1920s, which was seeking to borrow $125,000 
from U.S. lenders; in the end, the mayor of the hamlet was persuaded by the lenders that he should 
borrow $3,000,000. The second involves the case of exports-promoting loans, in which the employee 
of a medium-sized Midwestern bank pushed loans to the Philippines in order to please a U.S. client 
who was a manufacturer of earth-moving machines and who knew that the Philippines would use these 
loans to buy these machines.       
11 In a typical instance a bank employee  would inform a client that his deposit account had been 
“augmented” with so many thousands euros which were a loan offer that the client had never requested. 
Moreover, the client would have to go through some minor hassle (e.g. visit to the local branch) if he 
wanted to opt out of this arrangement.        9 
bilateral trade flows between Eurozone countries, in what follows we concentrate our 
discussion on the influence of factors other than the exchange rate.
12   
A key aspect of the pricing-to-market literature relies on the fact that exporters engage 
in multiple transactions, i.e. they sell in different (national) markets. For exporters to 
be able to price-to-market, markets must be geographically segmented.
13 The standard 
theoretical  framework  assumes  that  imperfectly  competitive  producers  sell  their 
output in many segmented destination markets, and set the export price   for each 
destination as a function of the common marginal cost and a destination -specific 
markup (e.g. Knetter, 1989; Marston, 1990). Studying the exporter’s pricing decisions 
within  this  framework  it  becomes  obvious  that  both  each  exporter’s  cost 
developments as well as developments which affect the shape and position of each 
importer’s (domestic) demand curve, will affect its pricing decision across markets. 
To accommodate these concerns we include in our empirical specification controls for 
the  potential  influence  of  demand  and  cost  developments  on  the  border  prices  of 
exporters to different destinations.  
 
 
                                                           
12 Although euro notes and coins were physically introduced on January 1, 2002, eleven of the twelve 
participating countries had fixed the exchange rates of their currencies from January 1, 1999. Greece, 
which formally joined the currency area on January 1, 2001, had its conversion rate to the euro fixed on 
June 19, 2000. The rate at which this conversion of the Greek drachma to the euro would take place 
was pre-announced on January 15, 2000, when the central rate around which drachma could fluctuate 
was set at 340.75 drachmas per euro.  The actual drachma/euro exchange rate moved smoothly from 
331 drachmas per euro in January 2001 to the fixed rate by the end of November 2001.   
13 But is the assumption of market segmentation across borders a good approximation of reality? Many 
studies indeed find that the costs imposed by international boundaries on the flow of goods across 
countries are substantial and markets are segmented (e.g. Engel and Rogers, 1996; Verboven, 1996; 
Parsley  and  Wei,  2001).  Yet,  other  studies  (e.g.  Goldberg  and  Verboven,  2001  and  2006)  find 
substantial increases through time in market integration for automobiles across five national markets 
(Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom). Nevertheless, it remains an open question 
whether these findings would also apply for countries in the European periphery or for goods whose 
expenditure shares are not a substantial part of household budgets.       10 
3. Empirics 
3.1 Data and Empirical Methodology 
The data we use are annual bilateral import and export unit values from 2000 to 2009, 
at the 4- digit SITC 3 level, constructed using import and export quantity and value 
data taken from OECD’s International Trade by Commodity Statistics.
14 The country 
sample consists of 11 euro area countries, i.e. i,j= Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Given that the total 
number of the 4- digit SITC 3 industries is 990, our total sample ends up with 594,327 
observations.  We estimate the following equation:  
1 2 4 1 2
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In equation (1), which is modeled along the lines of the pricing-to-market literature, 
imports
ijzt p
  is the log of the (border) unit value of imports of country i from country j, of 
product z at time t, and Net_capital_flowsit is the net capital flows as a share of GDP 
of country i at t, which are our main variables of interest.  
To account for the influence of various demand and supply factors which could affect 
the pricing decision of exporters, equation (1) includes the following variables: 
w
izt p is 
the log of the unit value of exports of (the importing) country i to the rest of the world 
of product z at time t. This variable is included as a proxy for the price that the 
importing country’s producers charge for their home sales,
15 and it is meant to capture 
shifts in the demand faced by exporters due to price competition by the importing 
                                                           
14 Data downloaded from OECD’s iLibrary at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
15  We  use  export  prices  since  there  are  no  data  available  for  producer  prices  at  this  level  of 
disaggregation.    11 
country’s producers. 
w
jzt p is the log of unit value of exports of country j to the rest of 
the world of product z at time t. This variable is included as a proxy for exporter costs 
(see, e.g. Goldberg and Knetter, 1997), and is meant to capture supply-side influences 
on exporter prices.  Market_shareijzt   stands for imports of country i from country j of 
product z divided by total imports of i of product z, and is included to control for the 
possible  influence  of  dynamic  demand-side  effects  arising  from  the  fact  that  the 
demand  curves  exporters’  expect  to  face  in  the  future,  depend  on  current  market 
shares  due  to  consumer  allegiance  effects  (Froot  and  Klemperer,  1989).
16  An 
alternative rationale for including this variable has been given by Feenstra et al. 
(1996), who have shown how market shares affect pricing decisions in response to 
demand disturbances.
17 Incomeit is the log of GDP per capita of country i at t, and 
controls for any increases in the quality (and hence, price) of imported goods as a 
result of higher incomes in the importing country. Consumption_taxit, is the share of 
revenue from indirect taxes as a share of GDP of country i at t, and controls for 
possible  changes  in  prices  due  to  changes  in  the  wedge  between  producer  and 
consumer  prices  that  changes  in  (the  importing  country’s)  taxes  engender. 
Interest_rateit is the real interest rate, measured by the real rate on long term (10-year) 
government bonds and controls for the interest rate effects on prices as in Basu and 
Morita (2007). Finally μi, λj, κt, ξz are the importer, exporter, time and industry fixed 
effects. Data on Net_capital_flows, Interest_rate and income are taken from IMF’s 
IFS database, whereas data for Consumption_tax are taken from the Ameco database. 
 
 
                                                           
16 Due to lack of data on total domestic (i.e. the importing country’s) expenditure on each product, this 
variable is used as an imperfect proxy for the market share that each country’s exports represent in the 
importing country’s market.   
17 Gaulier et al. (1998), in their study of export-pricing behavior at the product level for a large number 
of countries, found that market share is a significant determinant of pricing across markets.    12 
3.2 Main Results  
Results for equation (1) are given in Table 1. To allow the reader to appraise the 
robustness of our results, columns (1) to (4) present the estimated coefficients by 
introducing extra explanatory variables, beyond the ones always appearing in pricing-
to-market equations, one at a time.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p(importer) 0.685** 0.685** 0.685** 0.685** 0.684**
(32.675)    (32.657) (32.686) (32.678) (32.646)
p(exporter) 0.100** 0.100** 0.100** 0.100** 0.100**
(13.143)    (13.037) (13.051) (13.050) (13.050)
Market Share                -0.361** -0.361** -0.361** -0.361**
               (-7.214) (-7.217) (-7.220) (-7.208)
GDP per capita                0.765** 0.694** 0.627**
               (8.186) (7.486) (6.622)
Consumption Tax                -1.991** -2.568**
               (-4.535) (-5.623)
Net capital flows 1.065** 1.063** 0.899** 0.905** 0.841**
(11.431)    (11.412) (9.792) (9.831) (9.124)
Interest Rate                -1.443**
               (-5.236)
R-squared 0.408    0.409 0.409 0.409 0.409
obs 594327    594327 594327 594327 594327
industries 990    990 990 990 990
F-test 348.2459   354.3051 345.6615 335.716 331.077
F-year effects 30.16 35.92 36.13 29.84 29.00
F- importer effects 67.75 68.80 69.87 70.47 65.00
F-exporter effects 90.28 109.67 90.31 90.28 90.24
Clustered t-statistics in the parenthesis.*, ** denotes statistical signifficance at the 5% 
and 1% level of statistical signifficance respectively
Table 1: Dep. Variable log of price of imports for each product category
  
The strong statistical and economic significance of net capital flows on the prices 
charged  by exporters to  each destination (importing country) is  evident  across all 
specifications. The estimated coefficients for the net capital inflows variable decline   13 
slightly as the importing country’s GDP per capita is added in the estimating equation, 
and the same holds true for the influence of indirect taxes. The independent influence 
of these two variables on exporters’ pricing is consistent with theoretical priors; a 
higher GDP per capita for the importing country raises the price charged by exporters, 
and a higher burden of indirect taxes in the importing country lowers the (border) 
prices charged by exporters. The influence of GDP per capita can be attributed not 
only to changes in the position or elasticity of the demand curve, but also to exporters’ 
decision to differentiate the quality of their products across destinations.
18                                                    
The  estimated  influence  of  net  capital  flows  is  considerable.  According  to  the 
estimated coefficient in column (4), a ris e in a country’s (net) capital inflows by 5 
percentage points of GDP results in about 4.5 percent rise in the prices the country 
pays for its imports.  For a small country whose imports of goods are 30 percent of its 
GDP,
19 the annual cost in terms of income transferred to the rest of the world is equal 
to 1.35 percent of GDP.
20 This is a very large
21 extra burden - beyond the interest 
payments the country must make in order to service its foreign debt  – which lasts for 
as long as the country maintains that level of capital inflows. Any assessment of the 
net impact of capital flows on domestic welfare must take into account this extra cost 
of capital inflows.    
As  the  reader  can  verify  the  variable  capturing  the  exporters’  cost  conditions 
(approximated  by  exporters’  average  price  of  their  exports  of  product  z  to  all 
                                                           
18 For evidence documenting that higher-quality items are sold in higher-income countries see, e.g. 
Schott (2004), and Hallak (2008).   
19 If we assume that the same coefficient would apply for services imports, and  the total imports of 
goods and services amounts  to 40 percent of GDP, then the annual transfer which the importing 
country makes to the rest of the world rises to 1.8 percent of GDP.    
20 A full welfare analysis for the country receiving net capital inflows should also take into account the 
fact that import prices and the volume of imports are jointly determined.  
21 To appreciate how large is this extra burden (albeit temporary), we note that the Latin American 
countries could not manage to transfer more than 4 percent of their GDP abroad during the 1980s for 
more than a few years (before defaulting).     14 
destinations  –  we  term  this  variable  “world  price  (exporter)”)  has  a  significant 
influence on pricing to different destinations. The estimated coefficients are robust to 
different specifications and imply that a 10 percent rise in the price of a product z that 
a country’s exporters charge, on average, to all destinations, influences, on average, 
by about 1 percent the price charged to a particular destination. The influence of the 
importing country’s price developments is considerably higher; a rise by 10 percent in 
the price of  product z that the importing country’s exporters charge for their exports 
to all destinations, increases by about 7 percent the price the importing country pays 
for its imports of good z (from all destinations).
22  We also find that the larger is the 
share of a country’s exporters in the imports of product z, the lower will be the price 
charged  to  the  importing  country.  This  may  well  be  due  to  consumer-allegiance 
effects (Froot and Klemperer, 1989), but it may also simply be the result that larger 
market shares are associated with lower prices.   
As argued in the previous section, the prices that a country pays for its imports may 
be influenced by the interest rates prevailing in the country and by the interest rates it 
pays for its loans.
23 To account for this possibility, in column 5 we include in the 
estimated equation the real interest rate – approximated by the real return on 10 year 
government bonds. In accordance with theoretical priors (i.e. Basu and Morita, 2007) 
we find that (the importing country’s) real interest rates have a negative influence on 
the  prices  a  country  pays  for  its  imports.  Moreover,  we  find  that  including  this 
                                                           
22 For similar reasons, the evolution of the importing country’s consumer price index could also exert 
an influence on the pricing behavior of exporters. Including this variable among the set of explanatory 
variables did not produce any discernible change in our results. 
23 With respect to the possible interdependence between interest rates and capital flows we note that the 
correlation coefficient between the real interest rate and net capital flows is very low (-0.26). 
Moreover, when we introduce the real interest rate in the equation there is no significant change in the 
rest of the coefficients. Therefore it appears that there is no multicollinearity problem due to the 
inclusion of this variable.    15 
variable  does  not  affect  significantly  the  magnitude  by  which  capital  flows  are 
estimated to affect import prices. 
4. Robustness to Disaggregation  
In this section the sample used previously is disaggregated – first, by types of capital 
flows  and  product  categories,  and  second,  by  considering  individual  exporting 
countries.   
4.1 Disaggregating Between Types of Capital Flows and Product Categories 
Following the East Asian and Latin American crises of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
literature has differentiated between debt and non-debt capital flows. Among non-debt 
capital inflows, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been singled out as particularly 
resilient  during  sudden  stops  in  capital  inflows  (Calvo  and  Reinhart,  1999). 
Hausmann and Fern￡ndez-Arias (2001) noted that although debt flows to developing 
countries have been reversed (from inflows to outflows) during crises, FDI flows have 
been remarkably stable –and even increased in some cases. This has been attributed to 
the fact that FDI is “…bolted down and cannot leave so easily at the first sign of 
trouble”. From the present paper’s perspective, FDI inflows do not directly contribute 
to the spending power of domestic residents; instead, they may  help to alleviate the 
country’s technological and capacity constraints, thereby  increasing the price, and, 
more importantly for our purposes, non-price competition that foreign exporters face 
when selling to the domestic country.                  
To examine the, possibly, differential effects of FDI and non-FDI capital flows, we 
split in column 1 of Table 2 capital flows into these two constituents. We find that 
both  types  of  capital  flows  have  significant  influence  on  the  prices  charged  by   16 
exporters, and that the estimated coefficients are similar in size to the ones obtained in 
Table 1.   
   












p(importer) 0.684** 0.785** 0.454** 0.281** 0.630***
(32.649) (40.319) (4.388) (6.009)    (36.479)   
p(exporter) 0.100** 0.070** 0.078* 0.284**
(13.052) (9.203) (2.967) (11.940)   
Market Share -0.360** -0.129 -0.615** -0.618** -0.332***
(-7.198) (-1.950) (-7.476) (-5.841)    (-5.959)   
GDP per capita 0.701** 0.502** -0.015 0.362* 0.841***
(7.201) (3.408) (-0.064) (2.987)    (8.420)   
Consumption Tax -2.046** -3.333** -0.872 -1.750** -2.743***
(-4.434) (-4.697) (-0.566) (-3.008)    (-5.782)   
Net capital flows 0.721** 0.271 0.393* 1.209***
(4.762) (1.360) (2.842)    (11.783)   
Interest Rate -1.175** -1.481** -3.237** -1.671** -1.402***
(-4.226) (-3.570) (-3.573) (-4.816)    (-5.104)   
FDI(% GDP) 0.978**
(10.063)
Non-FDI flows (%GDP) 0.815**
(8.837)
R-squared 0.409 0.547 0.219 0.195    0.231   
obs 594327 297821 43901 169432    594327   
industries 990 500 86 260    990   
F-test 322.3948 259.5366 89.23062 114.6365   130.5801   
F-year effects 31.43 12.80 7.48 21.78 50.79
F- importer effects 64.96 40.62 7.25 21.41 68.52
F-exporter effects 90.24 63.22 6.71 15.72 58.91
Clustered t-statistics in the parenthesis. *,** denotes statistical signifficance at the 5% 
and 1% level of statistical signifficance respectively
Table 2: Dep. Variable log of price of imports for each product category
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the size of the coefficient on FDI flows is larger than the one on 
non-FDI  flows.  A  possible  explanation  for  this  finding  is  that  FDI  flows  are 
accompanied  by  increased  intra-firm  transactions  between  different  parts  of   17 
multinational corporations, intent on minimizing their overall tax burden by engaging 
in tax shifting across tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing. 
In columns 2, 3, and 4 we split the SITC industries into three different groups, i.e., 
industries with homogeneous products, industries with reference prices and industries 
with differentiated products. This is done in order to ascertain whether differences in 
the mode of market organization influences the way capital flows affect exporters’ 
pricing across destinations.  The a-priori expectation is that for differentiated products 
prices  do  not  signal  relative  scarcity,  and  according  to  Rauch  (1999),  this 
“uninformativeness of prices prevents ‘globally scanning’ traders from substituting 
for organized exchanges in matching international buyers and sellers”. We would thus 
expect  the  influence  of  capital  flows  on  pricing  to  be  more  pronounced  for 
differentiated products.    
This is indeed what we find.  The estimated coefficient on capital flows is largest (and 
statistically significant) in the case of differentiated products, statistically significant 
in the case of reference goods, and statistically insignificant in the case of goods 
whose trading is subject to organized exchange. It would indeed be surprising if we 
found  that  capital  inflows  had  a  significant  influence  on  the  prices  charged  by 
exporters  for  goods  traded  in  organized  exchanges  (e.g.  primary  commodities). 
Nevertheless, we do not wish to overemphasize this point since the classification of 
each SITC industry into one of the three groups is, for at least some industries, to 
some extent arbitrary (see, Rausch, 1999, for more details).
24 
Finally in column 5, we re- estimate our main equation, using this time the deviation 
of the price charged to each importer from the world price of the exporter ( i.e. 
                                                           
24 Column 3 also reveals that neither GDP-per-capita nor consumption taxes have any effect on the 
prices charged by exporters across locations.      18 
imports w
ijzt jzt pp  )  as  the  dependent  variable.  This  is  equivalent  to  assuming  that  the 
coefficient of the log of the world price of the exporter is equal to one. Once again the 
results do not change significantly from the baseline equation, and net capital flows 
retain their strong (statistical and economic) impact on import prices. 
4.2    Results for Individual Countries   
In Table 3, we present the results from estimating equation (1) by considering the 
exports of only one country (across time, commodities, and importing countries) for 
the four largest economies of the euro area (Germany, France, Italy, Spain), as well as 
for the United States and Japan. We note that for the last two countries we do not need 
to explicitly account for changes in the exchange rate since all the importing countries 
in our sample  have the euro as their currency and we have only a single exporter 
whose currency’s movements vis-￠-vis the euro are captured by the time fixed effects.  
With the exception of the average price charged by exporters, capital flows is the only 
variable which exerts a (statistically, and economically) significant influence on the 
prices charged by exporters for all countries examined. We note that unlike the results 
shown  in  Tables  1  and  2,  in  Table  3  we  find  that  GDP-per-capita  may  not  be  a 
statistically significant variable even though capital flows is (i.e. in the cases of Italy 
and US). A change in an importer’s GDP-per-capita may switch demand away from a 
country’s exporters, since it may be associated with a shift by consumers towards a 
price-quality combination which is not the exporting country’s forte.
25 In contrast, 
changes in the importing country’s spending power due to capital flows may affect 
symmetrically  all  exporters.  This  can  result  if  consumers  perceive  capital-flows 
                                                           
25 It is also possible that changes in GDP-per-capita are associated with changes in income inequality, 
thus producing shifts in product demand across quality segments – see, e.g. Adam, Katsimi, and 
Moutos (2012) for a theoretical and empirical investigation of this argument.    19 
induced changes in spending power to be of a temporary nature (i.e., they do not 
affect their permanent income), and thus making them more cautious about engaging 
in changes in the quality of goods consumed.          













p(importer) 0.665** 0.664** 0.641** 0.674** 0.744** 0.706**
(32.293) (26.487) (23.069) (31.990)    (32.409)    (39.023)   
p(exporter) 0.186** 0.060** 0.040 0.152** 0.036*   -0.015*  
(11.619) (4.091) (1.305) (11.888)    (2.287)    (-2.459)   
Market Share -0.024 -0.229* -0.059 0.140    0.291    -0.085   
(-0.331) (-2.407) (-0.682) (1.403)    (1.340)    (-0.692)   
GDP per capita 0.860** 1.032** 0.346 0.661** 2.350** 0.138   
(6.394) (6.628) (1.830) (4.033)    (8.197)    (0.630)   
Consumption Tax -4.024** -2.288** -1.251 -2.136*   -0.114** -0.073**
(-5.554) (-3.000) (-1.591) (-2.129)    (-9.076)    (-7.039)   
Net capital flows 1.366** 0.614** 0.894** 1.076** 4.093** 2.626**
(8.799) (4.163) (6.015) (6.366)    (15.654)    (11.935)   
Interest Rate -0.638 -0.170 -0.819 -1.232*   0.026** 0.008   
(-1.609) (-0.349) (-1.705) (-2.468)    (3.533)    (1.474)   
R-squared 0.509 0.430 0.426 0.488    0.456    0.475   
obs 72576 65644 63093 60008    38517    53317   
industries 986 983 878 985    932    984   
F-test 264.3438 136.1326 117.2509 254.3375   95.06172    134.539   
F-year effects 10.37 9.82 15.18 12.47 35.40 15.01
F- importer effects 35.25 36.50 35.57 54.24 52.50 57.38
Clustered t-statistics in the parenthesis. *,** denotes statistical signifficance at the 5% and 1% level 
of statistical signifficance respectively
Table 3: Dep. Variable log of price of imports for each product category. Pricing behavior of specific 
countries
 
The  strongest  influence  of  (the  importing  country’s)  capital  flows  is  on  Japanese 
exporters  and  the  lowest  on  French  exporters.  A  possible  explanation  for  this 
difference is that the share of differentiated goods’ exports in total Japanese exports is   20 
the highest in our sample, whereas the corresponding measure for French exports is 
the lowest (Japan: 76 percent, France: 50 percent).
26    
5. Conclusion 
Krugman’s (1987) defense of free trade in light of the modern developments in trade 
theory was not based on theoretical, but rather, on pragmatic arguments: “This is not 
the argument that free trade is optimal because markets are efficient. Instead it is a 
sadder but wiser argument for free trade as a rule of thumb in a world whose politics 
are as imperfect as its markets." Similarly, and following the accumulating evidence 
against the presumed beneficial effects of capital account liberalization, one may be 
tempted  to  conclude  that  although  capital  account  liberalization  has  not  delivered 
(yet?)  the  expected  benefits,  it  is  better  than  the  financial  repression  which 
characterized many middle-income countries.  
The present paper does not aim at resolving this debate. Instead, its modest aim is to 
contribute to this debate by drawing attention to another cost of net capital inflows, 
i.e. that in addition to the direct cost of income transfers abroad which a negative net 
investment position implies,  there exists also an indirect (but, substantial) cost of 
capital inflows. This is due to the higher prices that capital importing countries get 
charged  for  their  imports  of  goods.  Our  estimations  indicate  that  a  country  that 
increases its capital imports by 5 percentage points of GDP for 10 consecutive years, 
and its imports of goods are, on average,  30 percent of GDP during this period, the 
cumulative  cost  of  the  higher  import  prices  will  be  about  13.5  percent  of  GDP. 
Despite the temporary nature of this cost, it may be of particular relevance for the 
                                                           
26 The correlation coefficient between the coefficient on capital flows and the share of differentiated 
goods (according to the Rausch specification)  in total exports of each country is 0.7.    21 
cost-benefit calculations of financial globalization since the empirical evidence has 
not uncovered even small positive effects of capital imports on GDP growth rates.         
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Description Mean Std. Dev. Data source
p(imports-
dep. Variable) 2.07 2.28
OECD, International Trade by 
Commodity Statistics, authors, 
calculations
p(importer) 1.86 2.25
OECD, International Trade by 
Commodity Statistics, authors, 
calculations
p(exporter) 1.88 2.32
OECD, International Trade by 
Commodity Statistics, authors, 
calculations
Market Share 0.07 0.13
OECD, International Trade by 







Tax 0.13 0.01 AMECO database
Net capital 
flows 0.01 0.06
Balance of Payments Statistics, 
IMF
Interest Rate 0.02 0.01
International Financial 
Statistics, IMF
FDI(% GDP) 0.05 0.07 Balance of Payments Statistics, 
Non-FDI flows 
(%GDP) -0.03 0.09
Balance of Payments Statistics, 
IMF
Table A:Summary Statistics
Number of observations=594327; Number of SITC3 4-digit Industries=990
Log of border unit value of imports for each product 
category
Log of unit value of world exports of the importer 
Log of unit value of world exports of the exporter 
Imports of each product from the exporter divided 
by total imports of the corresponding product 
category
Log of real GDP per capita
Taxes linked to imports and production as a share of 
GDP
Capital Transfers and acquisition or disposal of
total assets as a % of GDP
Interest rate on 10year government bonds (nominal 
minus inflation)
Net Direct Investment as a % of GDP




















p(exporter) 0.71 0.73 1.00
Market Share -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 1.00
GDP per capita 0.04 0.10 0.00 -0.08 1.00
Consumption Tax -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.14 1.00
Net capital flows -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.71 -0.11 1.00
Interest Rate -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.05 -0.26 1.00
Non-FDI flows (%GDP) -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.60 0.02 0.68 -0.09 1.00
FDI(% GDP) 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.22 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 -0.79 1.00
Table B:Correlation Matrix
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 